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Abstract The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuro-
science as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the
cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in
the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining
the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze
throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of
“what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial
learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map for-
mation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior
(e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze
have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the
sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these
tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study
using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental
learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in
behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor
a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented
research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as
two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review
literature as to what is under study in the water maze.
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1 Introduction
Philosophers of science who have sought to understand the nature of neuroscientific
explanation have emphasized the importance of experiments for producing the data
requisite to identify the targets of such explanations. For example, Bickle (2006) views
the use of “well-accepted behavioral protocols” imported into cognitive neurobiology
from cognitive psychology as fundamental for this purpose (Bickle 2006). William
Bechtel, referring to the detection of mental mechanisms in cognitive science and neu-
roscience claims that in these domains “often experiments are required to delineate
the phenomenon for which a mechanism is responsible” (Bechtel 2008, 37). Craver
and Darden (2001, 122) emphasize the importance of “the accepted experimental
protocols for producing, manipulating, and detecting” phenomena in cognitive neuro-
biology, such as spatial memory. Yet, despite this general consensus that experiments
are fundamental for circumscribing explanatory targets in the contemporary cognitive
sciences and neurosciences, scarce effort has been directed at systematically evalu-
ating on a case-by-case basis how experimental learning paradigms (Sullivan 2007,
2009) are used to circumscribe phenomena and what they actually circumscribe.
An interesting case study for addressing such questions is the Morris water maze.
In 1981, nearly one decade after a set of important discoveries concerning the role of
the hippocampus in mammalian learning and memory (e.g., O’Keefe and Dostrovsky
1971; Bliss and Lømo 1973),1 Richard Morris described an apparatus that rapidly
became the premier device for studying the cellular and molecular mechanisms of
spatial learning and memory in the rodent (see Brandeis et al. 1989). The water
maze was, as of 2001, “one of the most frequently used laboratory tools in behav-
ioral neuroscience”, with over 2,000 papers citing its use from 1989 to 2001 alone
(see D’Hooge and De Deyn 2001). The widespread use of the maze in the scientific
literature prompted Craver and Darden that same year to appeal to it as a viable case
study for grounding an understanding of “the continuing discovery of the mechanism
of spatial memory” (Craver and Darden 2001, 112) in cognitive neurobiology.
However, despite its popularity as an experimental paradigm in neuroscience and
as a case study for thinking about mechanisms in philosophy of neuroscience, what
remains unclear is precisely “what” investigators who train rodents in the water maze
are actually investigating. In the context of the experimental and review literature
“Morris water maze performance” and “spatial memory” are used to refer to what
is under study. Within the category of cognitive functions alone, “spatial learning”,
“spatial memory”, “spatial navigation” and “spatial cognition” are all put forward
to capture it. Although various options are on offer for conceptualizing it, exper-
iments continue to be undertaken in order to discover its cellular and molecular
mechanisms. Philosophical analyses of the water maze to date, on the one hand,
characterize it as if it delineates a discrete phenomenon, namely, “spatial memory”
1 I describe these discoveries at the beginning of Sect. 4, below.
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(e.g., Craver and Darden 2001; Craver 2007). However, the New Mechanists also
allow for the possibility that explanandum phenomena, (i.e., the referent(s) of “spatial
memory”) are not required to be discrete because in the process of mechanism dis-
covery, they are subject to change. Although there is truth to this claim, it has only
served to shift the focus of philosophical analyses away from what makes experimen-
tal paradigms like the water maze interesting case studies for thinking about the kinds
of problems that may arise for generating mechanistic explanations when such para-
digms fail to delineate what investigators claim they do and for understanding why in
some cases multiple terms are put forward in order to capture “what” is under study.2
As an initial step towards understanding what exactly is produced, detected and
measured in the water maze, the primary target of my analysis in this paper is Richard
Morris’s original study (Morris 1981) using the device. I begin in Sect. 2 by briefly
describing how Craver and Darden (2001, and e.g., 2007) characterize the discovery
of the mechanism of spatial memory in experiments using the water maze, and point
out that they use the term “spatial memory” to refer to several different kinds of effects
that the maze produces. In Sect. 3, I appeal to the theoretical literature in cognitive
neurobiology as evidence that investigators differ in opinion with respect to which
kind of effect they intend to delineate in such experiments, and I identify problems
that arise with respect to the delineation of each one. This essentially constitutes a
framework that I use in Sect. 4 as a basis for determining what Morris succeeded
and failed to circumscribe in his original study using the water maze. I demonstrate
that he emerged from this study with an experimental learning paradigm that at best
circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it did not
delineate either a discrete set of representational changes or a discrete cognitive func-
tion. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular
and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1960s as two sources of the lack of
consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is
under study in the water maze.
2 Mechanisms and the Morris water maze
In their analysis of the Morris water maze as a primary instrument involved in “the
continuing discovery of the mechanism of spatial memory” (2001, 112), Craver and
Darden indirectly reveal an interesting problem in need of philosophical analysis. In
2 My interest in this issue is driven by a concern that mechanistic explanations have been characterized
as one form of reductive explanation (e.g., Bechtel 2009). If philosophical analyses of experimental para-
digms in cognitive neurobiology fail to identify what such paradigms circumscribe, then they may take the
scientists at their word that what is being circumscribed are cognitive functions (although not all cognitive
neurobiologists would claim this. See Sect. 3 below), when the paradigms at best circumscribe observable
changes in behavior. Yet, if the ultimate targets of mechanistic explanations in cognitive neurobiology are
nothing over and above observable changes in behavior, then there is no sense in which such explanations
are reductive. They are instead eliminative explanations in which a functional/representationalist ontology
for identifying psychological concepts is traded in for a behaviorist one (see e.g., Machamer 2009; Sullivan
2009, 518, fn. 3).
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order to characterize the nature of the problem, it is relevant to briefly introduce the
“standard version” of the water maze.3
The water maze is an uncontrolled open field maze that consists of a large circu-
lar pool filled with opaque water. It is placed in a room containing a discrete set of
fixed distal (i.e., external to the pool) visual cues. When placed into the pool, a rat
will attempt escape, and thus swim about the pool. The standard water maze exper-
iment consists of two training conditions and at least one probe trial. In the variable
placement fixed visible platform condition (from herein “the visible condition”), a
visible platform that protrudes slightly above the water’s surface is placed into one of
the four quadrants of the pool. While its location remains fixed across training trials,
the placement of the rat in the pool varies randomly with respect to the four cardinal
positions (i.e., N, S, E, W). The variable placement fixed hidden platform condition
(from herein “the hidden condition”) is identical in structure to the visible condition,
except that the platform is silvery-white and hidden just beneath the water’s surface so
as to be undetectable to a rodent in the maze. On each training trial, the swim path of
an animal in the maze, the length and direction of the angle of that path, and the time it
takes it to find the platform (“escape latency”) are measured. After a series of training
trials (typically no less than 15, often at least 20), rodent subjects are placed into a
platform-less pool. During a classic probe trial, the amount of time that the animal
spends in the four quadrants of the maze as well as the number of times it crosses in
and out of that quadrant of the pool in which the platform was located during training
are measured.4
Craver and Darden (2001) identify several possibilities with respect to what is
under study in the hidden condition of the water maze, in which it is supposed that a
rat learns the location of the hidden platform exclusively by appeal to the distal room
cues5 (Craver and Darden 2001, 122). First, they suggest that it is the capacity or fac-
ulty of spatial memory, which they define as “roughly, the ability to learn to navigate
through a novel environment” (Craver and Darden 2001, 112). However, they make
other claims that indicate that the phenomena under study may include processes such
as the “acquisition, storage and retrieval of spatial memories” (Craver and Darden
2001, 114). Then, in their representation of the “levels in the hierarchical organiza-
tion of spatial memory” at the top-most level the phenomenon identified is “mouse
navigating Morris water maze” (Craver and Darden 2001, 118, Figure 6.4), which is
a different kind of activity than learning how to navigate and is not identical to the
acquisition, storage and retrieval of spatial memories, although all of these activities
may indeed be prerequisite for navigation. Craver and Darden classify all of these
phenomena as “spatial memory”. This suggests that contrary to what they claim, there
are multiple different explanatory targets that are captured by this designation than
3 When I say “standard version”, I mean something very basic about the structural features of the water
maze, which may be separated from the variety of “sub-protocols” that are used in conjunction with these
features (Sullivan 2009).
4 It is common in the review literature for the “standard version” to include only the hidden condition. I
am presenting both conditions here for the sake of simplifying my analysis in Sect. 3.
5 I will revisit this supposition in Sect. 4.
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simply “the ability to learn to navigate through a novel environment” or “navigating
the water maze”.
Craver and Darden also describe spatial memory as “involv[ing] the formation
of an internal spatial representation—a cognitive map—by which different locations
and directions in the environment can be assessed” (2001, 122). In their hierarchical
depiction of the mechanism of spatial memory, however, the formation of the spatial
representation, which some may regard as the spatial memory itself, is situated at a
different level than the mouse’s navigation behavior. Yet on the basis of the figure, the
navigation behavior appears to be the target of the mechanistic explanation rather than
the spatial memory or its formation. In his recent book, Explaining the brain: Mech-
anisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience (2007, 166, Figure 5.I), Craver offers a
similar analysis of the water maze, spatial memory and its mechanisms as that offered
in the 2001 paper. While he admits that “there are many different spatial memory phe-
nomena”, he leaves the question of what phenomena the water maze circumscribes
open (Craver 2007, 165, fn. 4).
I think the ambiguity in Craver and Darden’s treatment of the phenomenon that the
water maze delineates stems from at least three sources. The first is a commitment
to Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) claim that “data are the evidence for phenomena”
(Craver and Darden 2001, 122). Craver and Darden indicate that experimental arrange-
ments like the Morris water maze are used to produce data that serve as evidence for a
phenomenon like spatial memory. However, they do not explicitly acknowledge that
the data that such experimental arrangements yield may be used to detect multiple
distinct kinds of phenomena (see for example, Feest, forthcoming; Sullivan 2009,
forthcoming). Second, their analysis directly reflects the lack of clarity in the experi-
mental and review literature in cognitive neurobiology with respect to what the water
maze circumscribes. Third, I take it that Craver and Darden’s aim (2001; Craver 2007)
is exclusively to understand the hierarchical structure of mechanistic explanations
and the spatial and temporal constraints characteristic of the mechanisms themselves,
which are, after all, on the side of the explanans rather than the explandum. Further-
more, the “New Mechanists” including Craver and Darden (2001; Craver 2007) and
Bechtel (e.g., 2008) allow for the possibility that mechanism discovery may proceed
without discrete explanatory targets.
Craver and Darden’s analysis of spatial memory and the water maze in combination
with what I have characterized above as a lack of clarity in the scientific literature as
to what the maze delineates prompts two questions. First, what phenomenon does the
maze actually circumscribe? My strategy for addressing this question is to go back
to Morris’s original study (1981) using the water maze, prior to its rapid and wide-
spread implementation in cognitive neurobiology in 1980s and 1990s. Second, why
are so many options on offer in the experimental and review literature with respect
to what it circumscribes? As I will demonstrate, answering the first question by way
of Morris’s original study will shed light on the answer to the second question. In
order to structure my analysis of the case study, I offer a framework for thinking about
the kinds of phenomena that experimental learning paradigms like the water maze
circumscribe in Sect. 3.
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3 What do experimental learning paradigms circumscribe?
As I understand the term, an experimental learning paradigm is a standard set of pro-
cedures for producing, measuring and detecting a form of learning and memory in the
laboratory (Sullivan 2007, 2009). It specifies how to produce a form of learning or
memory, which includes a description of what stimuli are to be presented to an organ-
ism, what the spatial and temporal arrangement of those stimuli ought to be, and when
and how many times they should be presented to the organism during pre-training,
training and post-training or testing. It also identifies the response variables to be mea-
sured during pre-training, training, and post-training/testing and how to measure them
using equipment that is designed for this purpose. Finally, it specifies how to detect
the form of learning or memory when it occurs, by identifying what the comparative
measurements of the selected response variables have to equal in order to ascribe to the
organism that form of learning or memory the investigator intends to produce. This is
essentially an operational definition (see for example, Chang 2004, 2009; Feest 2003,
2005), which I take to be built directly into the design of an experimental learning
paradigm.
In cognitive neurobiological experiments in which learning paradigms are used, the
response variables that are measured are always behaviors. Examples of behavioral
responses include freezing, sniffing, and food consumption. A baseline response to a
stimulus or set of stimuli measured before training in a paradigm typically constitutes
one data point. The behavioral response to that same or a different stimulus arrange-
ment after training constitutes another. A change in behavioral response may be
detected by comparing these two data points. If the relevant kind of change is detected
(i.e., that change specified in the operational definition), then the change in behav-
ioral response may be classified as an instance of the corresponding type of learning
or memory (e.g., conditioned fear). Although this may give the impression that the
phenomenon that is being detected or that is the target of an ensuing explanation is a
cognitive process or function that is distinct from the change in behavioral response,
many investigators in cognitive neurobiology only claim to be detecting the latter. For
example, in his textbook, Mechanisms of Memory (2009), the cognitive neurobiologist
David Sweatt indicates this very clearly in claiming that learning is:
the acquisition of an altered behavioral response, due to an environmental stim-
ulus; in other words, learning is when an animal changes its behavior pattern in
response to an experience. […] Note that what is defined is a change in a behav-
ior from a pre-existing baseline. Don’t get confused that I am defining learning
as a response to an environmental stimulus, but rather as an alteration in that
response due to an environmental stimulus. An animal has a baseline response,
experiences an environmental signal, and then has an altered response different
from its previous response (Sweatt 2009, 3).6
6 It is worthwhile to note that the water maze contains multiple different kinds of environmental stimuli,
making the tracking of behavioral responses to stimuli exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, investigators
have historically been unclear with respect to how to itemize these stimuli. For example, the distal room
cues may be treated as independent or compound stimuli (and compounds involving different groupings of
stimuli).
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To take an example that illustrates Sweatt’s point, in a fear-conditioning paradigm, the
level of freezing that an organism exhibits to the tone before training (i.e., baseline
response to tone) may be compared to the level of freezing the investigator measures
after the tone has been paired with a high-intensity shock. By appealing to these two
data points, an investigator is able to detect a change in the response variable—i.e.,
a change in the organism’s behavior. If a significant increase in freezing to tone is
what is required for conditioned fear learning ascriptions, it may simply be that such
ascriptions refer exclusively to the alterations in behavior, and what the paradigm
is taken to circumscribe from the standpoint of the investigator is an organism-level
phenomenon.
A primary problem with what John Bickle has referred to as this “reduction-in-
practice” strategy in cognitive neurobiology is that investigators use the same term to
classify the changes in response variables that they use to classify the realization or
instantiation of a cognitive capacity or function. For example, with respect to the data
obtained in a fear-conditioning paradigm, they do not refer to what they detect or what
they are trying to identify the cellular and molecular mechanisms of as increases in
levels of freezing in response to tone following multiple tone-shock pairings. Rather,
they refer to it as “fear-conditioning” or “learned fear”. This is misleading if it is
exclusively the changes in behavioral response variables that are the targets of their
cellular and molecular explanations and what they aim to intervene in the produc-
tion of. Of course, part of the problem is, as Bickle (2006) indicates, that the vast
majority of learning paradigms that cognitive neurobiologists use for the purpose of
circumscribing changes in behavior originate in areas of science that are interested
in “what” organisms learn, and those investigators do take the paradigms to circum-
scribe discrete cognitive capacities (e.g., social recognition). As a consequence, the
paradigms are referred to in ways that suggest that they produce and detect discrete
cognitive capacities. Investigators in cognitive neurobiology are thus appealing to the
same terms even though they are, with few exceptions (like those I identify below),
exclusively interested in behavioral changes.
However, some investigators do indicate that the data used to detect changes in
behavioral response variables may also be used to detect events causally prior to
those changes that are distinct from alterations in cellular and molecular activity. One
suggestion is that the data are used as a basis for ascribing changes in internal repre-
sentations (e.g., the formation of a tone-shock association) to an organism trained in
the learning paradigm (See for example Sullivan, forthcoming). For example, in the
fear-conditioning example, the baseline response to tone may be taken to indicate an
absence of a tone-shock association (i.e., representation) and the post-training response
to tone may be taken to indicate the presence of such a representation as a result of the
experimental manipulation (i.e., training in the learning paradigm). In support of this
possibility, in his textbook, The Neurobiology of Learning and Memory: Concepts,
Findings and Trends, Yadin Dudai defines learning as “an experience-dependent gen-
eration of enduring internal representations, and/or an experience-dependent lasting
modification in such representations” (1989, 6). The learning paradigm itself may
be designed so as provide the organism with an experience capable of generating a
representation of a specific type (e.g., tone-shock association). However, as Dudai
acknowledges if only indirectly, the investigator assumes that the control exerted over
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“what” the organism learns is built right into the overall experimental design and
production procedures of a learning paradigm. In other words, such production pro-
cedures are supposed to produce the formation of one type of representation rather
than another (or many others). The fundamental problem, however, is that even if
the investigator may use those production procedures to detect the changes in behav-
ioral response variables that he takes to be indicative of a specific type of change
in internal representations, the changes in behavior reveal little as to the content of
the representational changes, i.e., what is learned. In other words, the paradigm may
lack the control requisite for constraining what the organism learns, and thus lack
the reliability requisite for producing data that may be used to discriminate among
competing claims about ‘what’ the organism learned or what the changes in internal
representations actually are.
One approach to determining if a paradigm has the requisite kind of control is to
evaluate the relationship between the production procedures, the claims an investiga-
tor makes about how an organism behaves in the context of training and testing in the
paradigm, and what the investigator claims about “what” is learned on the basis of
the data. However, this approach requires a detailed consideration of the features of
the learning paradigm and the possibilities that it may afford or exclude with respect
to what is learned. It is highly unlikely that an investigator will successfully itemize
all of the possibilities with respect to what an organism may learn when run through
an experimental learning paradigm. This will impact the reliability of the data pro-
duction process in so far as the data may wrongly be used to discriminate claims
about one type of representational change when there are in fact others (even many
others). Additionally, if the representational changes are more extensive than the data
are taken to indicate, yet it turns out that these changes are grouped under that same
cognitive capacity or function as are the changes in behavior (e.g., if the change is
in spatial representations, then there is only spatial memory), many discrete types of
representational changes will be put forward as one (see Craver 2007 on “lumping
errors”). Thus what is circumscribed will seem unitary when it is not, and similarly
the target of any ensuing explanation will be treated as unitary when it is not. Such
problems may go unnoticed in those instances in which the discreteness of a set of
behavioral changes is used as a basis upon which to infer the discreteness of a set of
representational ones.
In the experimental and review literature in contemporary cognitive neurobiology
explicit appeals to changes in internal representations or “what” organisms learn are
rare although they sometimes occur (e.g., Machamer 2009; Sullivan et al. 2004, 2005;
Sullivan, forthcoming). It is more common in cognitive neurobiology that a learning
paradigm is used to produce data in order to detect “the behavioral expression” (i.e.,
changes in behavioral response variables) of a cognitive capacity. Thus, if the relevant
change in response variables occurs (e.g., increased levels of fear), an investigator will
infer that the cognitive capacity has occurred (e.g., associative learning).7 Similarly, in
the context of intervention experiments, if inhibiting a protein kinase is shown to dis-
rupt the behavioral expression of the capacity, then the investigator will likely assume
7 As Morris (1989) claims, “learning and memory are fundamentally psychological concepts inferred from
alterations in behavior in response to experience” (3052).
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that she has disrupted the cognitive function itself or some stage of that function (e.g.,
memory encoding or retrieval).
One problem with inferring cognitive capacities from data produced by means
of experimental learning paradigms is that those capacities are pitched at a fairly
course-grain (e.g., “spatial memory”, “social recognition memory”)—a grain that
likely includes numerous cognitive capacities and implicates many brain systems.
Thus, it is often unclear in the context of intervention experiments, which capacity
is being disrupted when performance in an experimental paradigm is shown to be
impaired.8 If an investigator fails to consider the variety of capacities, functions, and
processes that may be involved prior to, during, and after training (including dur-
ing inter-trial and inter-training block intervals), then claims with respect to ‘which’
capacity is disrupted or impaired by such interventions will be tentative at best. This
is likely one reason why claims in cognitive neurobiology are often qualified in so far
as a brain area or molecule is said to be “implicated in” a cognitive function, which
suggests that it is still an open question as to what functions or brain areas the overall
cognitive function includes and what role(s) the molecule plays. However, in such
cases, if an investigator makes interpretive claims on the basis of the data to the effect
that she has circumscribed a discrete cognitive function and identified its mechanism,
that function is likely not as discrete as the term used to refer to it implies. The ulti-
mate target of the mechanistic explanation that the paradigm is used to generate will
also not be discrete, although this may be missed given that the purported behavioral
expression of the cognitive capacity and its absence in the presence of intervention
experiments are taken to be discrete.
With this basic framework for thinking about the kinds of problems that may arise
with respect to using experimental paradigms to circumscribe learning and memory
phenomena in cognitive neurobiology, I turn to an analysis of the case study.
4 The Morris water maze
I described the basic structural features of the “standard version” of the Morris water
maze in Sect. 2 above. In this section, I am primarily interested in determining what
Richard Morris (a) intended to circumscribe by designing and implementing the water
maze in the laboratory, (b) what he actually managed to delineate by training rats in it,
and (c) what he claimed to have achieved. To this end, I revisit Morris’ first published
research study using the water maze and evaluate the reliability of the data production
process for discriminating between competing claims about ‘what’ it circumscribed.
Morris begins the paper by claiming “the distinction between ‘proximal’ and ‘dis-
tal’ orientation” is “crucial to [its] design” (Morris 1981, 240). He defines ‘proximal’
orientation as learning to approach a goal that is detectable by one or more senses,
whereas he understands ‘distal orientation’ to imply “learning about the spatial loca-
tion of a goal relative to distal cues” (Morris 1981, 240). As Morris indicates, at the
time of his writing the distinction was purely a theoretical one. “Proximal orienta-
tion”, if understood to be a form of learning, was taken to involve mechanisms of
8 Of course, this corresponds to the claim I made that the organism may be learning many things in the
context of a learning paradigm.
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associative learning. “Distal orientation”, in contrast, was thought to involve ‘place
learning’—learning the spatial location of a target relative to distal cues. Morris admits
that “it [was] not yet clear whether [the distinction] represent[ed] a valuable [one] with
respect to the underlying mechanisms of orientation” (Morris 1981, 240). However,
an encouraging set of discoveries in neurophysiology in the early 1970s led many
investigators to believe that it might be, which prompted Morris to aim to develop a
paradigm that could dissociate the two. It is worthwhile to briefly put the development
of the water maze into this broader historical context, to pinpoint the theoretical ideas
that shaped its development.
First by 1973, the literature in experimental psychology was rich with examples
of hungry rats demonstrating improved performance across training trials in locating
food rewards hidden in mazes. During training, their paths to the goals became more
direct and they took less time to reach them. Stimulus–response theorists (S–R), stim-
ulus–stimulus (S–S) theorists and field theorists put forward competing hypotheses
to explain such changes in behavior (e.g., see Tolman 1948). S–R theorists proposed
that rats learned how to navigate via the association of local cues (e.g., a corner in the
maze) with motor responses (e.g., a left or right turn) [i.e., “proximal orientation”].
S–S theorists assumed that associations were instead forged between discrete sets of
local cues (e.g., an odor and a corner of the maze) [i.e., “proximal orientation”]. In
contrast, proponents of field theory claimed that across trials a “cognitivelike map of
the environment gets established in the rat’s brain” (Tolman 1948), as the rat attends
exclusively to the spatial relations between the goal and the extramaze cues (i.e., “distal
orientation”/“place learning”) (Tolman et al. 1946, 1947; Restle 1957).
All three competing hypotheses accommodated the data equally well.9 However,
two physiological findings in the early 1970s were regarded as tipping the evidential
balance in favor of cognitive map theory. First, O’Keefe and Dostrovsky (1971) dis-
covered what they dubbed “place cells” in the hippocampus—a set of pyramidal cells
that may fire bursts of action potentials in response to specific spatial locations when
a rat freely moves about in an environment.10 This discovery lent support to the idea
that as rats explore a maze, thus sampling that environmental space, coordinates in
that space come to be represented in the hippocampus, such that no location prompt
(“S”) would be requisite to elicit a turn (“R”). The rats could instead distally orient to
a target by appeal to the representation of the spatial relations holding between it and
the extramaze cues that was distributed across hippocampal place cells.
The second finding was Terge Lømo and Tim Bliss’s discovery of a long-lasting
potentiation (LLP, later known as long-term potentiation (LTP)) in the hippocampus
of the anesthetized rabbit, which instantiated the very features that Hebb (1949) had
ascribed to the neurophysiological correlate of learning and memory. LTP offered a
plausible neurophysiological mechanism for the formation of cognitive maps distrib-
uted across place cells in the hippocampus (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978).11 This finding
9 There were additional hypotheses that also accommodated the data (see Tolman 1948).
10 “Place cells” may fire in response to non-place cues as well (see for example, Redish 2001).
11 It should be pointed out, however, that persistent increases in synaptic strength could also be regarded as
the mechanism for the formation of S–S and S–R connections in an organism’s brain. In fact, Hebb (1949)
intended his postulate to capture how such associative connections were forged between neurons.
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was compatible with the idea that once a representation was stored across place cells
in the hippocampus, a rodent could appeal exclusively to it in order to find its way in
a maze.
The only item that was missing, then, was an experimental learning paradigm that
would serve to connect the neurophysiological findings to learning and memory. Mor-
ris claimed that the reason that none of the available mazes could serve this function is
that they failed to solve what he dubbed “the local cue problem” (Morris 2003, 244).
All the available mazes contained local cues such that it was impossible to determine
whether rats oriented to a goal in a maze via (1) local or ‘proximal’ cues, (2) a com-
bination of ‘local’ cues and motor responses (3) the extra-maze ‘distal’ cues” (e.g.,
cues outside of the maze apparatus, including, e.g., radiators, bookcases, doors of
the laboratory room) or (4) all of the above. Local cues (e.g., corners in mazes, odor
trails) were thus confounds that would have to be eliminated in any task that sought
to circumscribe distal orientation or place learning. Morris’s solution to the “local cue
problem” was the hidden condition of the water maze.12
Morris’s study may thus be understood to begin with the following empirical ques-
tion: Can rats “rapidly learn to locate an object that they can never see, hear, or smell
provided it remains in a fixed spatial location relative to distal room cues (Morris
1981, 239)?”13 This empirical question corresponds to two competing hypotheses:
(1) rats can rapidly learn to locate a hidden object provided it remains in a fixed
spatial location relative to distal room cues and (2) rats cannot do so. At first blush,
these competing hypotheses may seem modest and non-committal with respect to what
rats learn and how—as if Morris is interested in producing data requisite to relegate
between competing claims about something closer to observable changes in behavior
than changes in internal representations or cognitive functions. However, he intends
the data to establish that learning in the hidden condition involves the formation of
a certain kind of representation (i.e., a cognitive map) and the activities of a discrete
type of cognitive function (i.e., place learning (which already includes distal orien-
tation)). Evidence for this point is that the experimental design and protocols that
12 Morris, however was undertaking a project that some investigators had argued could not get off the
ground. For example, in a paper in 1957, the experimental psychologist Frank Restle, in a paper that Morris
(1981) cites, indicated in response to the work of psychologists like Tolman, Ritchie and Kalish that “place
learning” was not a valid construct:
there is nothing in the nature of a rat which makes it a ‘place learner’, or a ‘response’ learner. A rat in
a maze will use all relevant cues, and the importance of any class of cues depends on the amount of
relevant stimulation provided as well as the sensory capacities of the animal. […]. The writer’s general
conclusion is that further ‘definitive’ studies of the place-vs.-response controversy, to prove that rats are
by nature either place or response learners would be fruitless since the issue is incorrectly drawn” (Restle
1957, 227).
13 As Morris claims:
One day, it occurred to me that rats might be able to learn while swimming and that this might help
solve the local cue problem. I wondered if they could escape from water onto a platform that was hidden
beneath the water surface and so was neither visible, audible, offered no olfactory cues and could not
be identified using somatosensory cues until the animal had already successfully navigated to it. (Morris
2003, 644)
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correspond to the water maze are intended to constrain how and what rats trained in
each condition of the maze learn. But was the data production process reliable in so
far as it offered such constraints? In order to answer this question, I will focus on those
data obtained from training rats in the hidden condition as well as those additional
data that serve to strengthen the claims that Morris makes about the data obtained in
the hidden condition.
In Morris’s original study the water maze was placed in the center of a room con-
taining four fixed visual distal room cues, one per wall (shelves, a door, a window, and
a cupboard) (Morris 1981, 242). Rats were given two pre-training trials (180 s/day
for 2 days) to acclimate them to swimming in the pool. They were then divided into
four groups (eight per group). Each group was run through 20 training trials (“escape
trials”) of one of four maze conditions spread across 3 days. In addition to the visi-
ble and hidden platform conditions (described in Sect. 2), one group of rats was run
through a random visible condition, in which the placement of the rat in the pool as
well as placement of the visible platform in the pool randomly shifted across trials. A
fourth group was trained with the hidden platform randomly shifting from quadrant
to quadrant across all 20 trials.14
Morris used an electronic timer to measure each rat subject’s latency to reach the
platform on each trial (Morris 1981, 242). He then averaged the performance of sub-
jects in each group on each trial (e.g., Morris 1981, 246, Figure 3). A video camera
positioned above the center of the pool was used to record each animal’s trajectory
through the pool. These recordings were used to determine the length and angle of
an animal’s swim path from the point of placement in the maze to its arrival atop the
platform on the last four training trials (Morris 1981, 241). Morris also calculated the
mean path length and median direction of the path for each group with respect to these
last four training trials (Morris 1981, 247). On the testing or “probe trials”, which
immediately followed training, he first placed rats into a platform-less pool, and then
into a pool with a platform in either a different or a fixed location. During these probe
trials he calculated the amount of time that rats spent in each of the four quadrants of
the pool and how many times they crossed in and out of each of the four quadrants.
Morris defined “spatial localization” generally as the ability to learn to locate a
platform, irrespective of whether it is visible or hidden, in the pool. He operationally
defined it as a significant decrease in escape latency across training trials. He deter-
mined such decreases by comparing the data points obtained for each group across all
20 training trials. The other measurements he took were used to characterize the qual-
itative features of the observable changes in behavior across groups. For example, the
angle of the path in which the animal headed on the last four training trials was taken
to indicate the accuracy of its directional heading towards the platform. He defined
“spatial bias”, a feature of the pattern of a rat’s swimming path in the pool during
probe trials, as more time spent in that quadrant of the pool in which the platform had
been located during training than in any other quadrant of the pool.
Morris engages in a comparative analysis of the data obtained across all four con-
ditions in order to discriminate between the two competing hypotheses I identified
14 Morris dubbed these four groups: (1) “Group Cue + Place”, (2) “Group Place”, (3) “Group Cue Random”,
and (4) “Group Place Random”.
123
Synthese (2010) 177:261–283 273
above. First, taking the data obtained from the hidden condition in isolation, he claims
that rats trained in the hidden condition exhibited rapid and significant decreases in
their escape latencies across trials that were comparable to those of rats trained in both
visible platform conditions. Secondly, he points out that on the last four training trials,
the swim paths that they took to the platform were as direct as those taken by rats
trained in the visible platform conditions. He also notes that compared to rats trained
in the visible platform conditions, the “spatial bias” of rats trained in the hidden con-
dition is more pronounced. He appeals to the data obtained from the random hidden
condition as a basis for claiming that the spatial relationships between the platform
and distal room cues being kept fixed were essential for the rapid decreases in escape
latency exhibited by rats trained in the hidden condition. He also uses these data as a
basis for making claims about ‘what’ rats in two hidden groups learned. He suggests
that rats in the random hidden condition must learn only that “escape is possible”
(Morris 1981, 246), which accounts for the slight decreases in their escape latency as
well as the fact that they never reach the levels of performance of rats trained in the
hidden condition.15
Although this one study may be regarded as insufficient for establishing the reliabil-
ity of the hidden condition of the water maze for detecting a discrete set of changes in
behavioral response variables, the data that Morris presents are sufficient to establish
that the swimming behavior of eight rats changes significantly when they are trained
in the hidden condition of the water maze and that they exhibit a set of behaviors
post-training and during testing that were not exhibited prior to such training. One
way to describe the changes is simply that rats trained in the hidden condition exhibit
improved performance in several dimensions (i.e., decreases in escape latency, more
accurate heading to the platform, a bias for the training quadrant)—i.e., their behavior
changes. Morris in fact begins by providing a modest interpretation of the data in so
far as he suggests they may be taken to indicate that rats trained in the hidden condition
are successful with respect to “localization of a hidden object” (Morris 1981, 252).
However, the paper does not end with this claim. It is followed by a question, namely
“How did the rats do this?” (Morris 1981, 252).
I interpret the very raising of this question as an admission on Morris’s part that
the data could not be used to discriminate between the two competing hypotheses
I identified above if they are taken to include claims about what and how rats trained
in the hidden condition learned. In raising it Morris may be regarded as admitting
that the data production process was reliable in so far as it produced a set of data
that indicated that rats trained in the fixed hidden condition located the platform time
and time again. However, accounting for the decreases in escape latency across trials
observed in this group (detected by a comparison across individual data points for
each training trial run) was a different matter. The decreases indicated that the rats
got better at finding the platform over time. Yet, those decreases could not be used to
detect “what” the representational changes were, i.e., “what” rats trained in the hidden
condition learned, or “how” they learned it (i.e., what the function was).
15 I will return to this point in Sect. 5.
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The interesting question, then, if the data produced in the hidden condition of the
water maze did not discriminate between the two competing hypotheses—if it failed
to reveal how and what rats trained in the hidden condition learn, on what basis does
Morris go on to infer that the data may be used to serve both of these functions?16
Towards the end of the paper, Morris draws a distinction between (a) the nature of
the change in the rats’ representation of the spatial environment across training trials
(i.e., representational changes) and (b) the mechanisms productive of those repre-
sentational changes (i.e., the capacity—associative mechanisms versus place learning
mechanisms). He appeals to the “behavioral flexibility” of rats trained on the hid-
den condition of the platform as the basis upon which to infer that the “form of the
stored representation” is most likely a cognitive map. He identifies two “separate
demonstrations of this putative flexibility”, namely, that these rats rapidly learn the
location of the hidden platform and during probe trials they exhibit “a novel search
strategy” in so far as they search for the platform in its previous location in the pool.
Nothing in the data provides him with the precise content of “what” rats in the hid-
den condition learn. He tries to get at the nature of that content indirectly based on
received views about the kinds of behaviors that cognitive representations in contrast
to associative representations afford.
With respect to whether or not Morris thinks that the hidden condition of the water
maze circumscribes a discrete learning capacity to go along with the purported repre-
sentational changes—I think we encounter an ambiguous answer. Given his endorse-
16 At this point in his paper, Morris identifies three competing hypotheses that respond to the question of
how rats trained in the hidden condition learn the location of the platform as well as what they learn. His
very positing of these hypotheses suggests that his attempt to constrain the range of competing hypotheses
as to how rats in the hidden condition learn the location of the platform may have failed, so he requires addi-
tional data to discriminate among these competing hypotheses. Interestingly, these hypotheses correspond
directly to that set of competing hypotheses (i.e., S–S, S–R and field theories) that other maze experiments
could not be used to produce data to discriminate between because they all contained “local cues”. The
first hypothesis is that rats trained in the hidden condition relied exclusively on the relationship between
the hidden platform and the extra-maze cues in order to locate it (i.e., “place learning” or cognitive map
theory). The second posits that “rats learned four distinct cue-approach responses” in relationship to the
extra-maze cues (S–R theory) (Morris 1981, 253). The third suggests that the rats “learned to swim off at
various angles from the side walls from the different starting positions” (253) and thus locate the platform
(S–S theory).
To discriminate among these hypotheses, Morris conducted an additional experiment, namely “a transfer
test”. His rationale for running this experiments was to test the predictions of these three hypotheses under
conditions in which rats were repeatedly trained in one condition of the maze, but then tested on another.
Whereas the associative learning theories both predict that rats trained in one condition of the maze will
not be able to generalize to another, the cognitive map theory predicts that they will due to the behavioral
flexibility that the representations formed by such learning affords. So, Morris trained a group of rats in the
water maze for a total of 15 escape trials. All three groups were placed into the pool at the same starting
location (W) with the location of the hidden platform (NE) being held constant across trials. By the end
of the training trials, all three groups exhibited significant decreases in escape latency. They were then
divided into three groups and each group was exposed to a different testing condition. The first group was
tested on a condition in which the angular relationship between the starting location of the rat in the pool
and the location of the platform was identical to that angular relationship on which they had been trained
(W–NE). The angular configurations on which they were tested thus were N–SE, E–SW, and S–NW. In the
second group the platform remained in the same location, but the rats were placed into the pool at one of the
three other starting locations (i.e., N, S, E). In the third group, the conditions remained the same as during
training.
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ment of cognitive map theory and his referring to rats in the hidden condition as “Group
Place”, we might anticipate that he would claim that these rats orient distally and are
place learners. However, at the end of the paper he claims that “the results provide sup-
port for the cognitive mapping theory of spatial localization but no definite evidence
that the processes underlying the formation of a map or its use in behavior are distinct
from those processes explored in traditional studies of associative learning” (Morris
1981, 259). This suggests that the nature of the cognitive function is for him an open
question.17 This means that coming out of the 1981 paper, Morris had put forward
detection techniques that did serve to circumscribe a set of observable changes in
behavior. However, there was no concept to which such changes in behavior attached
with respect to an operational definition. In other words, Morris developed a means
to detect a set of behavioral changes, but he had not identified what psychological
function or set of representational changes they were indicative of.
As I aim to show in the next section, this state of affairs in combination with
a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neuroscience pro-
vided fertile grounds for leaving these questions unanswered and for the changes in
behavior observed in the hidden condition to become subject to multiple different
Footnote 16 continued
Morris compared the mean escape latency for each group on the last 3 training trials to their escape
latency on the first three testing trials. The mean escape latency of subjects tested on the condition in which
the angular relationships were held constant increased significantly during the testing trials and on average
they spent more time in that quadrant of the pool in which the platform had been located during training.
In contrast, the escape latency of subjects tested on the other two conditions remained the same across the
training and testing trials and the data indicated that their swim paths to the platform were both short and
direct. Morris suggests that if the rats trained in the fixed angle configuration had learned to “swim off at a
particular angle from the side walls” in order to locate the platform (Morris 1981, 255), they would have
had no difficulty finding the platform during the testing trials. However, the increases in escape latency and
the amount of time they spent in the quadrant of the pool in which the platform was located during training
suggest that they learned “the place” of the platform relative to the distal room cues, rather than learning to
swim at an angle from the starting position in the pool. Second, Morris claims that because subjects tested
in the condition in which the location of the hidden platform was the same as that during the training trials
do not exhibit an increase in escape latency when they are placed into the pool at different start locations,
“they [have not] acquired any simple S–S association of swimming towards a specific distal cue” (Morris
1981, 255). He briefly attempts to turn back objections to his interpretation of these data, but then concludes
that these additional data are consistent with “the cognitive mapping account” (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978)
being “the most parsimonious interpretation of the data with its explicit claim that the stored representation
of the distal room cues permits the generation of novel directional behavior” (Morris 1981, 227).
This second set of experiments adds little if anything to our understanding of what rats trained in the
hidden condition in the first set of experiments learn. The combined data from the “fixed platform” training
conditions (and probe trials for those groups) make it look as if when the spatial arrangement of the platform
and distal cues is kept constant rodents will appeal to those cues in order to locate the platform. This is one
interpretation of the data—merely appealing to the data from rats trained in the hidden condition to arrive
at claims about their behavior does not reveal how and what those rats learn. In addition, with respect to
this second set of experiments, it is not clear that Morris had exhausted all of the options for what might
count as an instance of S–S or S–R learning in the water maze (e.g., see Tolman 1948) or, more specifically,
he had not exhausted all of the possible options for what might constitute a response (i.e., there are other
motor movements that the rats are making besides swimming at angles, for example) or a local cue for the
rat.
17 He acknowledges that it remains an open question at the end of a 1982 experimental paper as well as in a
1984 methodology paper. In fact the problem is not explicitly addressed until a 1990 paper, in collaboration
with Eichenbaum and Stewart, described in Sect. 5.
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classifications. For the sake of brevity, at best I offer only part of a complex story—a
subset of additional factors that have contributed to oscillations in the experimental
and review literature as to what the water maze delineates.
5 The Morris water maze post-1981
Neuroscientific investigations using the water maze could have gone in at least two
general directions subsequent to the publication of Morris’s original study. First, they
could have been directed at determining the component informational and representa-
tional processes involved in rodent performance on the hidden condition of the water
maze. However, they could have veered in another direction, namely, to determine
the cellular and molecular mechanisms of the observable changes in behavior exhib-
ited by rats trained in the hidden condition. There is a wide array of evidence to
suggest that investigators, especially Morris, were initially engaged in both types of
projects. However, because reductionist-oriented approaches—approaches that turned
away from thinking about component informational and representational processes to
focus on the synaptic and cellular-level processes of encoding, storage and retrieval—
held sway in cognitive neurobiology, in that research domain the dominant strategy
became as Bickle (2006) characterizes it “intervene cellular-molecularly and track
behaviorally”. This does not mean that all investigators in cognitive neurobiology
turned a blind eye to interesting patterns of behavior exhibited by rats trained in the
water maze during their production and intervention experiments.18 In fact, in con-
junction with their cellular and molecular studies it was customary to offer hypotheses
as to the various kinds of things that rodents trained in the water maze learned, at
what stages different representational and informational processes were operative and
when different cognitive functions effectively “kicked in” (e.g., see Brandeis et al.
1989; D’Hooge and De Deyn 2001). These findings, however, took a back seat to the
data linking cellular and molecular activity to the observable changes in behavior, and
were often bracketed in the results and discussion sections in experimental studies
and dealt with somewhat causally in the review literature. Primarily because Morris’s
original study left what (i.e., the representations) rats trained in the hidden condition
learned and how (i.e., via which capacities or functions) open questions that no one
in cognitive neurobiology actively sought to systematically address, different terms
were put forward to designate the observable changes in behavior.
As evidence in support of these claims, I appeal to a very small subset of the exper-
imental and review literature from 1981 to 2004. To begin, I focus on Morris’s own
studies using the water maze and then turn to insights contained in several represen-
tative review papers.
Between the years 1982 to 1992, Morris referred to the observable changes in behav-
ior in the hidden condition variously as “place navigation” (e.g., 1982, 1989), “place
learning” (e.g., 1986, 1989; Eichenbaum et al. 1990), “spatial localization” (1984)
18 As I indicated in Sect. 2, investigators in cognitive neurobiology have different sensibilities with respect
to what experimental paradigms circumscribe and what they take the targets of their explanations to be. The
options are changes in behavioral response variables (e.g., Sweatt 2009), changes in internal representations
(e.g., Dudai 1989), and the activation of cognitive capacities.
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and “spatial learning” (e.g., 1984, 1989; Morris et al. 1990; Davis et al. 1992). In one
set of intervention experiments, Morris et al. (1982) trained rats with hippocampal
lesions in the hidden condition of the water maze. The data indicated that, compared
to controls, the performance of hippocampal lesioned rats on the hidden condition was
impaired. Morris and colleagues describe this as an impairment in place navigation.
The designation “place navigation” appears to be intended to capture the fact that at
least two discrete processes occur in the context of the hidden condition: learning the
location of the hidden platform and navigating towards it. The lesioning studies in
conjunction with the behavioral data did not afford the precision to identify which
process was impaired, which may explain the designation. Of course, whether normal
rats trained in the hidden condition were place learners or place navigators still lacked
the requisite evidential support.
Beginning in 1986 and continuing until the late 1990’s, Morris’s intervention
studies using the water maze were directed at determining the role played by
N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptors in ‘what’ was under study in the water maze.
In the early 1980s a number of studies had yielded data in support of the idea that block-
ade of NMDA receptors by aminophosphonovaleric acid (APV) blocked the induc-
tion of activity-dependent LTP at hippocampal synapses, but neither its maintenance
nor its expression. This prompted the question of whether NMDA receptor blockade
may block learning (i.e., acquisition) but not memory retrieval. While acquisition and
retrieval are stages in information processing, they can be correlated with observable
changes in behavior in a way that enables an investigator to bypass questions of what is
learned or what component processes precede or are involved in such acquisition (e.g.,
attention). In essence the categories offer one bottom-up strategy for parsing rodents’
behavioral performance in the hidden condition into discrete stages while obscuring
“what” and “how” they learn. So, the drive to link the mechanisms of LTP induction
to ‘what’ was under study in the hidden condition prompted a reclassification of the
observable changes in behavior from “place navigation” (which implies acquisition,
storage and retrieval) to “place learning”, which implies that the hidden condition may
be used exclusively to study the impact of microinfusing APV in the hippocampus
on learning and memory acquisition. Data from intervention studies conducted from
1986 to the late 1990s are now widely taken to establish that NMDA-receptor blockade
specifically impairs learning in the water maze, that this impairment is dose-related
and that the deficit is anterograde (e.g., Morris 1989; Morris et al. 1990; Davis et al.
1992).
After 1990, “place learning” was for the most part replaced by “spatial learning”
to identify what is under study in the water maze. Several factors may have contrib-
uted to this shift. First, during the years after the original study, Morris indicated that
learning in the hidden condition, “may involve” either “‘cognitive mapping”’ or “a
‘snapshot’ procedure for homing in on the correct location”, which cast doubt on the
idea that place learning was the cognitive function under study in the hidden condition
and that the representational changes amounted to the formation of a cognitive map
(Morris 1984, 58). In the early 1990s he engaged in both independent and collabo-
rative research (e.g., 1990; Eichenbaum et al. 1990) as a means to determine “which
procedure” rats trained in the hidden condition employ. Eichenbaum et al. (1990)
introduced two forms of place learning that correspond to these two procedures and
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dissociated them on the basis of differences in the behavioral performance of rats with
fornix lesions (effecting hippocampal functioning) compared to normal rats on two
conditions of the hidden water maze task. The first condition was the standard hidden
condition. The second condition differed from it only in so far as rats were placed
into the pool at the same starting position across trials. Eichenbaum and colleagues
interpreted the data as lending support to Morris’s (1981) original claim that normal
rats trained in the variable hidden condition of the water maze, given the flexibility of
their behaviors (i.e., returning to platform from novel start locations and spatial bias
during probe trials), learn “a place represented in terms of positional relations among
environmental cues and observer”, (1990, 3531) rather than merely “a simple asso-
ciation between an individual set of cues and the behavior reinforced by successful
escape” (1990, 3539). In contrast, rats without a functional hippocampus are forced to
depend on associative cues (i.e., a snapshot procedure) to locate the hidden platform.19
However, to use the designation “place learning” to capture the observable changes
in behavior in both conditions of the water maze, when in one condition the learning
is described as associative whereas in the other it is a form of learning distinct from
associative learning (i.e., place learning) was contrary to the definition of that form
of learning dating back to Tolman. This may be one contributing factor in the dimin-
ished frequency of the usage of the term post 1990 to capture the observable changes
in behavior in the standard hidden condition of the water maze and the increased
frequency of the designation “spatial learning” (e.g., Davis et al. 1992; Morris et al.
1990) to capture it. However, the data obtained from these experiments also raised the
possibility that rats trained in the standard hidden condition could use two kinds of
strategies to locate the hidden platform—thus the designation “spatial learning” made
more sense in so far as it included both possibilities.
Although I have evaluated only a subset of Morris and colleagues’ research using
the water maze, I think what becomes clear as we look across even this subset of the
experimental and review literature is that uncertainty with respect to what rats trained
in the hidden condition learn and how they learn it persisted while the use of the water
maze in cognitive neurobiology post-1990 escalated (see for example Sutherland and
Hamilton 2004; D’Hooge and De Deyn 2001). Between the years 1989 to 2001 alone
over 2,000 research papers using the hidden condition of the water maze had been
published. In concluding this section, I want to consider a couple of review papers that
indicate further fluctuations in the experimental and review literature up until 2004 as
to what the hidden condition delineated.
As I mentioned earlier in this section, a primary aim of contemporary cognitive
neurobiology is to identify the cellular and molecular mechanisms of learning and
memory. Immediately following publication of Morris’s 1981 study, the water maze
was implemented in a number of laboratories both for the purposes of running inter-
vention experiments (i.e., lesioning and pharmacology) and testing out a wide array of
experimental protocols used in conjunction with the maze (see Brandeis et al. 1989).
The changes in behavior that Morris had produced in normal rats in the hidden con-
dition proved to be robust in so far as they were widely replicated across laboratories.
19 This of course affords the possibility that the normal rats in the standard hidden condition could use
both strategies to locate the platform (see for example Brandeis et al. 1989; D’Hooge and De Deyn 2001).
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To return to the framework I introduced in Sect. 3 of this paper, investigators in
cognitive neurobiology occupy different perspectives with respect to what experimen-
tal paradigms may be used to circumscribe. Some, like Sweatt, use learning paradigms
exclusively to draw conclusions about the role of cellular and molecular activity in
the production of observable changes in behavior. Thus, one is not likely to find much
in the way of an analysis of “what” and “how” rats trained in the hidden condition
learn (see Sullivan forthcoming). Furthermore, how a set of observable changes in
behavior is classified will either not matter so much, or it will only matter in so far
as one is attempting to correlate stages in synaptic, cellular and molecular changes
with behavioral ones. Other cognitive neurobiologists, like Dudai and Morris, who
acknowledge that there are representational changes that mediate behavioral changes
are more likely to point out patterns in the behavioral data that indicate the formation
of discrete kinds of representations, although they are not expressly interested in the
project of experimentally teasing them apart and investigating them. Finally, it turns
out that investigators who are interested in the component cognitive processes that
contribute to observable changes in behavior discriminated in learning paradigms like
the water maze tend to work in more cognitive areas of neuroscience, which may also
be appealed to as a factor contributing to the oscillations in cognitive neurobiology as
to how to classify what is under study in the water maze.
Given that some cognitive neurobiologists have sought to better understand what
is under study in the water maze, various options as to what the functions are, what is
learned and how are on offer across the experimental and review literature and I think
this may be cited as one of the reasons why most recently “water maze performance”
and “spatial navigation” are used more frequently to capture the observable changes
in behavior (see for example, Redish 1999, 2001; Sutherland and Hamilton 2004). For
example, rodents trained in the maze are said to learn: to swim (Morris 1981), to swim
towards the platform, to swim away from the side walls, that escape is possible or that
the platform offers escape (Morris 1981), how to climb on top of the platform or use
the platform (Morris 1989, 3046), where the platform is in relationship to distal room
cues (Morris 1981), where the platform is in relationship to distal cues and where they
are (“allocentric representation”) (Eichenbaum et al. 1990), associative relationships
(e.g., swim (R) towards that cue configuration (S)), and how to navigate the maze
(e.g., Brandeis et al. 1989; D’Hooge and De Deyn 2001; Morris and Frey 1997). The
forms of learning include: place learning, associative learning, reward-based or rein-
forcement learning, spatial learning and non-spatial learning (see for example Hodges
1996). The learning strategies are thought to include: snapshot strategies, taxis strat-
egies, mapping strategies and praxis strategies (e.g., Redish 1999). The navigational
strategies are said to include: place navigation, taxon navigation, typically classified
under the more general category of spatial navigation (e.g., Redish 1999, 2001). Other
functions involved include vision, sensory perception, attention, working memory,
long-term memory (i.e., encoding and retrieval), and the activity of the entire motor
system.
Although I have not included in the list the processes involved during probe trials
for spatial bias, I think two points have been made. The first is that there are a lot of
observable changes in a rodent’s behavior in the water maze to which an investigator
may appeal in order to understand those cognitive processes internal to the organism
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that are involved in different stages of the task. The intention of providing the list is
to make the case that the behavioral effects treated independently or together corre-
spond to or are by-products of various kinds of representational changes, cognitive
capacities and processes. When we think about ‘what’ the maze circumscribes from
this perspective, classifying the behavioral effects under “spatial learning” or “spatial
memory” serves to wrongly lump together the many processes that likely contribute
to these behavioral effects. To classify them under “water maze performance” (e.g.,
D’Hooge and De Deyn) avoids this problem, but this solution will not be satisfying
for an investigator who is not aiming to discover the component cognitive functions
or cellular and molecular mechanisms of water maze performance. I take the vast
majority of cognitive neurobiologists as intending to direct their mechanistic explana-
tions at something more general. I think this explains the recent tendency to classify
the behaviors under study in the water maze and other maze tasks more generally
as “spatial navigation”, which would be inclusive of all of the aforementioned kinds
of changes in internal representation and componential processes and serves to link
those changes and processes to observable changes in behavior in a way that “spatial
learning” and “spatial memory” do not. Of course, given the lack of control over how
and what is going on with respect to animals trained in the hidden condition of the
water maze, perhaps, as D’Hooge and De Deyn indicate, we should either develop
better experimental paradigms or as Sutherland and Hamilton indicate, we should
turn our attention towards providing a more systematic account of the component
informational processes that come online in such training contexts.
6 Conclusions
My first aim in this paper was to address the question of what phenomenon the Morris
water maze circumscribes. The generating circumstance was that the philosophical,
experimental and review literature provided no guidance in locating an answer to the
question. The second aim of the paper was to identify some of the potential sources of
the oscillations in those concepts used to refer to the changes in behavior delineated
by the water maze across the history of its use. I do not take myself to have offered
anywhere close to a thorough analysis, although I think the preliminary analysis does
successfully identify some of the sources.
I think the kinds of fluctuations that occurred in the experimental and review liter-
ature with respect to what the water maze delineated were to some extent unavoidable
in the 1980s and 1990s given the drive in cognitive neurobiology towards identifying
the cellular and molecular mechanisms of learning and memory. However, as neuro-
scientists Robert Sutherland and Derek Hamilton (2004) suggest, investigators who
use experimental devices like the water maze can no longer ignore “the constituent
[informational] processes” (688, 697) that “contribute to their behavioral outcome
measures” (688). They posit a model intended to serve as a framework for thinking
about the nature of these processes, thus stressing the importance of functional analysis
(see for example, Cummins 1975) for getting clear on what phenomena experimental
learning paradigms actually circumscribe. In a similar vein, I suggest (Sullivan forth-
coming) that if investigators in cognitive neurobiology are interested in providing
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cellular and molecular explanations of more than behavioral performance in this or
that experimental learning paradigm, identifying how and what organisms trained in
them actually learn will have to be, going forward, a fundamental part of the research
project. The precise details of how this will work in practice will have to be left for
another paper.
Acknowledgments An earlier version of this paper was presented at two philosophical workshops. The
first workshop entitled “Realization, Multiplicity and Experimentation in Biology, Psychology & Neuro-
science” was organized by the author and held at the University of Alabama at Birmingham in February
2010. The author benefitted greatly from comments by audience members including: Marshall Abrams, Ken
Aizawa, Erik Angner, Ted Benditt, John Bickle, Carl Gillett, Philippe Huneman, Tom Polger, Larry Shap-
iro, Lynn Stephens and Sven Walter. The author would also like to thank Harold Kincaid and The Center
for Ethics and Values in the Sciences for generously supporting this workshop. The second workshop was
“Current Topics in Philosophy of the Human Sciences” organized by Uljana Feest and held in June 2010 at
the Technische Universität in Berlin, Germany. The author would like to thank Uljana for the opportunity
to present this paper and members of that audience, especially Maria Kronfeldner and Catherine Stinson,
for helpful comments during the discussion period. Finally, the author would like to thank Floh Thiels for
many very helpful discussions about on the water maze.
References
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. New
York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Bechtel, W. (2009). Molecules, systems, and behavior: Another view of memory consolidation. In J. Bickle
(Ed.), Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience (pp. 13–40). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bickle, J. (2003). Philosophy and neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishing.
Bickle, J. (2006). Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current
cellular and molecular neuroscience. Synthese, 151, 411–434.
Bliss, T., & Lømo, T. (1973). Long-lasting potentiation of synaptic transmission in the dentate area of
the anaesthetized rabbit following stimulation of the perforant path. Journal of Physiology, 232(2),
331–356.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97, 303–352.
Brandeis, R., Brandys, Y., & Yehuda, S. (1989). The use of the Morris water maze in the study of
memory and learning. International Journal of Neuroscience, 48, 29–69.
Chang, H. (2004). Inventing temperature: Measurement and scientific progress. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Chang, H. (2009). Operationalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. Retrieved July 16,
2009, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/.
Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Craver, C., & Darden, L. (2001). Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial mem-
ory. In P. K. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and method in the neurosci-
ences (pp. 112–136). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. The Journal of Philosophy, 72(20), 741–765.
Davis, S., Butcher, S., & Morris, R. G. (1992). The NMDA receptor antagonist D-2-amino-5-phos-
phonopentanoate (D-AP5) impairs spatial learning and LTP in vivo at intracerebral concentrations
comparable to those that block LTP in vitro. Journal of Neuroscience, 12(1), 21–34.
D’Hooge, R., & De Deyn, P. (2001). Applications of the Morris water maze in the study of learning
and memory. Brain Research Reviews, 36, 60–90.
Dudai, Y. (1989). The neurobiology of memory: Concepts, findings, trends. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Dudai, Y. (2002). Memory from A to Z: Keywords, concepts and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
123
282 Synthese (2010) 177:261–283
Eichenbaum, H., Stewart, C., & Morris, R.G. (1990). Hippocampal representation in place learning. The
Journal of Neuroscience, 10(11), 3531–3542.
Feest, U. (2003). Operationism, experimentation, and concept formation. Doctoral Dissertation, University
of Pittsburgh.
Feest, U. (2005). Operationism in psychology: What the debate is about, what the debate should be
about. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 41(2), 131–149.
Feest, U. (Forthcoming). What exactly is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized? Synthese.
Hebb, D. O. (1949 [2002]). The organization of behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hodges, H. (1996). Maze procedures: The radial-arm and water maze compared. Cognitive Brain
Research, 3, 167–181.
Machamer, P. K. (2009). Neuroscience, learning and the return to behaviorism. In J. Bickle (Ed.), The
Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience (pp. 166–178). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morris, R. G. (1981). Spatial localization does not require the presence of local cues. Learning and
Motivation, 12, 239–260.
Morris, R. G. (1984). Developments of a water-maze procedure for studying spatial learning in the
rat. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 11, 47–60.
Morris, R. G. (1989). Synaptic plasticity and learning: Selective impairment of learning rats and blockade
of long-term potentiation in vivo by the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor antagonist AP5. Journal
of Neuroscience, 9(9), 3040–3057.
Morris, R. G. (1990). Toward a representational hypothesis of the role of hippocampal synaptic plas-
ticity in spatial and other forms of learning. Cold Spring Harbor Symposium in Quantitative
Biology, 5, 161–173.
Morris, R. G. (2003). Long-term potentiation and memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London B, 358, 643–647.
Morris, R. G., Anderson, E., Lynch, G., & Baudry, M. (1986). Selective impairment of learn-
ing and blockade of long-term potentiation by an N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor antagonist,
AP5. Nature, 319, 774–776.
Morris, R. G., Davis, S., & Butcher, S. P. (1990). Hippocampal synaptic plasticity and NMDA receptors:
A role in information storage?. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B
Biological Sciences, 329(1253), 187–204.
Morris, R. G., & Frey, U. (1997). Hippocampal synaptic plasticity: Role in spatial learning or the
automatic recording of attended experience? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London B, 352, 1489–1503.
Morris, R. G., Garrud, P., Rawlins, J., & O’Keefe, J. (1982). Place navigation impaired in rats with
hippocampal lesions. Nature, 297, 681–683.
O’Keefe, J., & Dostrovsky, J. (1971). The hippocampus as a spatial map. Preliminary evidence form
unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Research, 34, 171–175.
O’Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. (1978). The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Redish, A. D. (1999). Beyond the cognitive map: From place cells to episodic memory. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Redish, A. D. (2001). The hippocampal debate: Are we asking the right questions?. Behavioral Brain
Research, 127, 81–98.
Restle, F. (1957). Discrimination of cues in mazes: A resolution of the ‘place-vs.-response’ question. The
Psychological Review, 64(4), 217–228.
Sullivan, J. A. (2007). Reliability and validity of experiment in the neurobiology of learning and memory.
Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
Sullivan, J. A. (2009). The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and
non-reductionist models of the unity of neuro science. Synthese, 167(3), 511–539.
Sullivan, J. A. (Forthcoming). A role for representation in cognitive neurobiology. Philosophy of Science,
PSA 2008 symposia papers.
Sullivan, J. A., Machamer, P. K., & Thiels, E. (2004). The study of learning and memory then and
now: evidence for conceptual change? Paper presented at the Society for Neuroscience Annual
Meeting, San Diego, CA.
Sullivan, J. A., Machamer, P. K., & Thiels, E. (2005). The study of learning and memory then and now:
Conceptual problems and experimental limitations. Paper presented at the Learning and Memory
Workshop, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY.
123
Synthese (2010) 177:261–283 283
Sutherland, R. J., & Hamilton, D. A. (2004). Rodent spatial navigation: At the crossroads of cognition
and movement. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 28, 687–697.
Sweatt, J. D. (2009). Mechanisms of memory (2nd ed.). London: Academic Press.
Tolman, E. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55, 189–208.
Tolman, E. C., Ritchie, B. F., & Kalish, D. (1946). Studies in spatial learning. II. Place learning versus
response learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35, 221–229.
Tolman, E. C., Ritchie, B. F., & Kalish, D. (1947). Studies in spatial learning. V. Response learning vs.
place learning by the non-correction method. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37, 285–292.
123
